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GIFTS, OFFICES, AND CORRUPTION 
Zephyr Teachout* 
I. FOUR DISPUTES AND ONE AGREEMENT 
When the Americans set up their new, independent government, they 
brought an original attitude towards offices and gifts which separated them 
from Europe. Gifts, which were part of European diplomatic culture, were 
recast as corrupt influences. And offices were viewed with fear of their 
corrupting power, given the examples of Europe. The “corner-stone” of the 
new Constitution, according to one delegate, was the provision designed to 
prevent lucrative offices from being sold and traded for political power.1 
This Essay, a response to Seth Barrett Tillman’s challenge to my previous 
writing on founding era anxiety about corruption, is a partial exploration of 
the scope of the clauses relating to gifts and office holding. 
Tillman2 and I disagree about four significant things, but we agree 
about one even more significant thing. First, we disagree about how to 
interpret the changes in the Foreign Emoluments Clause from the Articles 
of Confederation to the Constitution. Second, we disagree about the 
precision with which the words “office under/of the United States” were 
used in the Constitution. Third, we disagree about how important these 
disputes are for contemporary constitutional doctrine. Fourth, we disagree 
about the degree of obsession with corruption exhibited by the men who 
wrote the original American Constitution. The bulk of this response will be 
to explain some of my thoughts on these disagreements. 
However, these disagreements all lie in the shadow of one major 
agreement: that the Constitution contains within it a structural commitment 
to fighting corruption. Our disagreements go to the scope of the anti-
corruption principle, not its existence. Were our shared understanding to 
prevail, it would have a substantial effect on doctrine, especially in the area 
of political regulation. It would likely change the outcomes in some of the 
more controversial cases in recent years—such as Citizens United3—and 
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would certainly change the methodology by which the Justices reached 
their outcomes, because they would have to address a constitutionally 
weighty interest in election regulation. Adoption of the principle would also 
affect the broad cultural understanding of what the American Constitution 
is intended to do, and would therefore affect our understanding of ourselves 
as Americans; our national identity is derived in part from our relationship 
to what we perceive to be constitutional principle. 
Given this agreement, I am interested to hear what Professor Tillman 
thinks about some questions I am exploring about the anti-corruption 
principle (ACP). The question of whether—and how—the ACP is a 
constitutional principle forces questions of when, how, and which non-
textual principles should have doctrinal force. If it is a principle, how 
should it interact with doctrine? If it is a canon of construction, what other 
clauses can it help construe? The ACP forces some basic questions that are 
often shunted aside, as academics and judges assume two structural 
principles (separation of powers and federalism) without explaining why 
those two, and not others, get pride of place in doctrine. What makes a 
constitutional principle one that can legitimately be credited with separate 
weight in doctrine? How can one tell the difference between a 
“constitutional principle” and a canon of construction that goes to the 
interpretation of the language? Furthermore, do we have the other 
“principles” right? Should we understand the separation of powers as a 
freestanding commitment to separate, co-equal branches of government, or 
is it better understood as an extension of the Framers’ concern with the 
corrupting dangers of appointments powers? An important set of essays by 
John Manning challenges the idea of structural principles from the 
perspective of a textualist who rejects the model.4 
I am not quite the originalist Tillman makes me out to be. Rather, I am 
interested in understanding the Constitution’s relationship to corruption for 
a set of quasi-originalist reasons. First, I am concerned that the First 
Amendment is the cause of much bad law in recent years. Explaining the 
corruption history behind our Constitution should check some of the more 
dangerous tendencies within First Amendment absolutism. If one is going 
to be an originalist in talking about the First Amendment, one ought to take 
great care to give weight to the corruption concerns at the time of framing. 
Second, I find the history important because it reflects the thinking of the 
Framers; an intelligent, thoughtful group of people who had a striking 
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combination of theoretical and practical experience. We ought to attend to 
their thinking and anxiety with some respect. Third, history is important 
because of the threat of dependencies on money and power to our current 
democracy, where similar—though not precisely the same—kinds of 
corruption are rampant. Fourth, purpose must always be an important part 
of any reading of the Constitution; not as a matter of strict originalism, but 
as a way to understand what was intended as a constraint on judicial 
overreach. 
And finally, as the prior paragraph suggests, I am interested in the 
selective use of structural principles by the courts.5 Many of the concerns 
that people have raised about the “anti-corruption principle” are not specific 
to the anti-corruption principle, but apply to all constitutional principles. If 
one believes that the anti-corruption principle requires a textual hook, one 
clearly should make the same requirement of the separation of powers 
principle or reject it as a freestanding principle with independent weight.6 
That said, Tillman’s specific challenges warrant response. In this piece, 
I will argue: first, that the tweaks in the Foreign Emoluments Clause from 
the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution do not constitute a 
weakening; second, that the meaning of “office under the United States” 
was not clearly confined to appointed offices at the time of the 
Constitution’s writing; and third, that the outcome of our disagreement on 
whether the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to elected officials is not 
important for whether or not an anti-corruption principle should be 
recognized. Finally, and throughout, I will discuss our disagreement about 
whether the men who wrote the Constitution were focused to the point of 
obsession on corruption concerns. 
II. THE FOREIGN EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE 
There are nearly two dozen features of the original American 
Constitution that were designed to combat corruption, including the veto 
power and the requirements for legislative override, the census, the 
residency requirements for representatives, the rules governing payments, 
the electoral college, and the Ineligibility Clause.7 Tillman points out one—
the Foreign Emoluments Clause—and argues that because I misunderstand 
it, the strength of the anti-corruption principle is called into question. He is 
correct to say I put a great deal of emphasis on it, and I do so somewhat for 
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symbolic reasons. But my own emphasis echoes the anxiety about foreign 
gifts that existed at the time of the Constitutional Convention. 
A. The Foreign Emoluments Clause in the Constitution and the Articles of 
Confederation 
The Foreign Emoluments Clause (FEC) in the Constitution states: 
 
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: 
And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under 
them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of 
any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind 
whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.8 
 
My focus in my earlier writing, and the focus of our debate, is the 
prohibition on accepting presents. This clause is derived from an earlier 
clause within the Articles of Confederation which stated: 
 
[N]or shall any person holding any office of profit or trust 
under the United States, or any of them, accept of any 
present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, 
from any king, prince or foreign State; nor shall the United 
States, in Congress assembled, or any of them, grant any 
title of nobility.9 
 
As Tillman notes, these two provisions are not precisely the same.10 
The first difference between the two is that the Constitution’s version 
allows for Congress’s approval in the acceptance of gifts. By providing that 
gifts may not be accepted “without the Consent of Congress,” it opens up 
the possibility of Congress’s approval. The second difference is that the 
Articles of Confederation prohibition covered “any person holding any 
office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them,” whereas 
the Constitutional prohibition covers any “person holding any office of 
profit or trust under them.” 
The concern with corruption in this provision was twofold. First, there 
was a particular concern that agents of the United States would lose their 
allegiance (or would be suspected of doing so) because of the opulent gifts 
from foreign princes, in particular those from France.11 Second, this clause 
is a rejection of the entire political culture of old Europe, which was seen as 
 
8
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (link). 
9
  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 1 (link). 
10
  See Tillman, supra note 2, at 5. 
11
  See DAVID ROBERTSON, DEBATES AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA 
321–45 (Richmond, Enquirer-Press 2d ed. 1805) (link). 
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corrupt. As Thomas Jefferson wrote, explaining what he saw as the 
prevailing view of 1790: 
 
We have a perfect horror at everything like connecting 
ourselves with the politics of Europe. It would indeed be 
advantageous to us to have neutral rights established on a 
broad ground; but no dependence can be placed in any 
European coalition for that. They have so many other bye-
interests of greater weight, that some one or other will 
always be bought off. To be entangled with them would be 
a much greater evil than a temporary acquiescence in the 
false principles which have prevailed.12 
 
The Foreign Emoluments Clause usefully exemplifies the Founders’ 
efforts to redefine the scope of corruption more broadly than England or 
France. As Randolph explained in the debates about the Constitution in 
Virginia, “[t]his restriction was provided to prevent corruption.”13 It is, and 
was understood to be at the time, a fairly radical break from the generally 
accepted practice of nations in foreign affairs. The particular ban against 
receiving foreign gifts finds its initial source in the Dutch Republic, which 
adopted a rule in 1651 that its foreign ministers were not allowed to take 
“any presents, directly or indirectly, in any manner or way whatever.”14 
A contemporary writer critiquing the Dutch rule wrote: “The Custom 
of making a Present . . . [is] so well establish’d that it is of as great an 
Extent as the Law of Nations it self, there is Reason to be surpris’d at the 
Regulation that has been made on that Subject in Holland.”15 He made fun 
of their puritanical refusal to accept even the most trivial presents, and 
mocks them for imagining themselves as creating a “Republic[] of Plato” in 
the “Fens and Marshes.”16 
In choosing to adopt, and then maintain the rule against United States 
representatives accepting foreign gifts, the Founders were truly trying to 
create their own “Plato’s Republic” against what they perceived as corrupt 
European practices. 
Gifts of the sort referred to in the clause were exactly the currency of 
diplomacy at the time that Jefferson so abhorred. The King of France, Louis 
XVI, had a love of snuffboxes—so much so that he gave them his own 
 
12
  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Oct. 3, 1801), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 284, 287 (1903) (link). 
13
  See ROBERTSON, supra note 11, at 330. 
14
  5 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 651 (1906) (quoting Dutch 
Republic regulation) (link). 
15
  MONSIEUR DE WICQUEFORT, THE EMBASSADOR AND HIS FUNCTIONS 292 (John Digby trans. 
London, Bernard Lintott 1716) (emphasis omitted) (link). 
16
  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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name, “boîte à portrait.”17 He was very fond of giving extravagant versions 
of these boxes, set with diamonds, to diplomats. The American recipients of 
these gifts showed repeated anxiety about what to do with them.18 The new 
country was trying so hard to separate itself from courtly culture, and the 
Articles of Confederation forbade accepting these gifts, but it seemed 
terrible form to reject them outright. 
When Arthur Lee received one such jeweled snuffbox from Louis 
XVI,19 he was concerned about the impacts of accepting it. He wrote to a 
friend that the situation might “excite some murmurs,” and thought that the 
Articles of Confederation might prevent accepting the gift.20 He wrote to his 
brother, “[a]s you may imagine, I was embarrassed about receiving or 
refusing it.”21 He explained that he had told the court that receiving such a 
gift was against the rules of those he represented. According to Lee, “[t]he 
Count answered that this was a mark of his Majesty’s esteem, and was 
never refused.”22 Lee accepted the gift, but gave it to Congress to determine 
what to do with it. As he was then embroiled in accusations that he had 
given offense to the French court, the gift also served for Lee as 
“proof . . . of the untruth” of the accusations against him.23  
When Benjamin Franklin was leaving France after several years in 
Paris, he too received “the usual gift to a minister plenipotentiary after 
someone had signed a treaty with the French court.”24 But this was an 
especially extravagant version of it—an extraordinarily expensive and 
elaborate boîte à portrait. It bore the portrait of Louis XVI on a particularly 
impressive gold box.25
 
On the top were 408 embedded diamonds “of a 
beautiful Water,” all crowning the box forming a “Wreath round the Picture 
and a Crown on the Top.”26 It was this box, or perhaps Lee’s box, that 
Governor Randolph referred to in his explanation of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause when he explained during the ratification debates that: 
“A box was presented to our ambassador by the king of our allies. It was 
thought proper, in order to exclude corruption and foreign influence, to 
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B. The Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause Was Not a Deliberate 
Weakening of the Foreign Emoluments Clause from the Articles of 
Confederation 
 
Tillman misreads the two changes in the clause from the Articles of 
Confederation to the Constitution. He argues that the changes undermine 
the notion that the men who drafted the Constitution were deeply focused 
on the problem of protecting against corruption. According to Tillman, the 
later clause weakened the earlier clause, and “obsession” is thus too strong 
a word to use in describing the Framers’ mindset.28 
I disagree. The first change, the addition of Congressional 
acquiescence in the Constitution’s FEC, simply codifies the accepted 
interpretation of what the clause required previously. When Lee and 
Franklin received their snuffboxes, they clearly thought it satisfied the 
clause to present the gift to Congress, and if Congress approved, they (and 
Congress) believed they could keep it without violating the rule. This 
appears to be a direct adoption of the Dutch practice. According to John 
Quincy Adams, he asked friends in Holland how they interpreted the clause, 
and was told that the absolute language of the clause merely forbade the 
unilateral acceptance of gifts; they could be kept if the government granted 
permission.29 
Therefore, the change merely puts in writing what was already the 
accepted meaning of the clause. Moreover, Congressional acquiescence is 
not a minor check. It takes power from the executive branch and gives 
Congress oversight responsibility to make sure that officers (the scope of 
which is discussed below) are not being seduced from their obligations to 
the country. The congressional requirement leads to a radical transparency 
and interrogation that could chill quiet transfers of wealth for affection. 
Tillman argues that the second change, in which the Articles’ “office 
of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them”30 is replaced in the 
Constitution by “Office of Profit or Trust under them”31 is significant in that 
it uses the word “them” instead of “it”; in other words, the fact that the 
Constitution uses a plural—instead of a singular—designation implies that 
state officers are not covered by the Foreign Emoluments Clause. 
However, “them” is used a handful of times in the Constitution to refer 
to the United States, typically in cases where it seems that the states 
themselves are implicated. In the Presidential Emoluments Clause, the 
President is prohibited from receiving emoluments from “the United States, 
 
28
  See Tillman, supra note 2, at 5. 
29
  See Letter from John Quincy Adams to John Adams (June 7, 1797), in 2 WRITINGS OF JOHN 
QUINCY ADAMS 180 n.1 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1913) (link). 
30
  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 1 (link). 
31
  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 8 (link). 
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or any of them.”32 In Article III, Section 3, Clause 3, the United States is 
referred to as “them” instead of “it” when defining treason: “Treason 
against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or 
in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”33 In this 
treason description, it seems that the best reading (regarding this “them”) is 
that treason would include levying war against an individual state, and not 
just the entire country, because of the word “them.” Other times, no “them” 
is referred to at all, but the “United States” stands alone. Of course, at the 
same time that the new country was being formed it was still conceived of 
as a plural combination of elements, instead of a unity, such that the 
descriptor them and not the unified it, fit the mental picture of the writers. 
The “them” in the Foreign Emoluments Clause could thus mean either it or 
them, and therefore the prohibition could apply either to all officers, or 
merely to those employed by the federal government. Moreover, it could 
have different meanings for different people who read it, but because the 
topic was not raised as a matter for debate, it was not clarified. 
However, Tillman’s reading that the prohibition was deliberately 
narrowed to the federal government is arguably a better reading. Even if so, 
it does not seem likely to me that the committee on style, or a politicized 
member of that committee (on instruction or recommendation), shortened 
the phrase in order to allow state officials to accept gifts from foreign 
princes when they are acting as representatives. Instead, the fact that the 
Constitution so squarely puts foreign affairs into the hands of the federal 
government, and completely out of the hands of state governments, means 
one important thing: gifts to state officers, even if they were allowed, could 
not be tied to foreign policy. 
A gift, whether to a state office holder or to a mere citizen, is only 
threatening inasmuch as it has any power to shift the orientation of the 
receiver towards the giver and away from the interests of the American 
people. If a recipient of a gift has no power to influence foreign policy, then 
even if his allegiances are slightly shifted, they are shifted on a matter that 
the recipient has no ability to influence. Consequently, the threat of 
corruption is negligent at best, and most likely non-existent.34 
In short, even if states were intentionally excluded, the shift does not 
constitute an intentional grant of greater power to state officials to accept 
foreign gifts when representing the country, simply because they cannot 
 
32
  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
33
  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
34
  My own experience with politics suggests that complete awareness of grammar and its 
implications comes only when there are particular highly interested parties (and there is no reason to 
think that there was an interested group of state officials who were aspiring to be foreign gift recipients), 
or debate, or a great deal more time and effort than was spent on this Constitution. In this, I suppose I 
differ slightly from Nicholas Rosenkrantz, who implicitly imagines a more completely aware drafting 
committee. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1005 
(2011) (link). 
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represent the country. Without this intention, even if the “Constitution of 
1787 liberalized the foreign government gift-giving regime in regard to 
state offices,”35 this liberalization does not reflect a lack of concern about 
corruption. 
That the clause was taken seriously despite the fact that it has no means 
of enforcement within it is perhaps best exemplified by a fascinating 
anecdote. Thomas Jefferson, during his own tour as a diplomat, thought at 
first that he would be free from the custom of receiving gifts, which he 
found distasteful. As one of his biographers put it, “Jefferson thought [the 
royal gift] mercifully prohibited by the new Constitution.”36 He knew that 
while he had to give a gift, he could not receive one. He wrote to his 
assistant William Short, asking him to make the “accustomary present for 
me” to the ambassadors—a “gold snuff box” for one and money for the 
other, so that he could pick out his own snuffbox.37 In addition, Jefferson 
said, to let the appropriate parties know: 
 
[T]hat I cannot receive the accustomary present from the 
King. [E]xplain to them that clause in our new constitution 
which sais ‘no person holding any office of profit or trust 
under the U. S. shall accept any present, emolument, office, 
or title of any kind whatever from any king, prince or 
foreign state;.’ [I]t adds indeed ‘without the consent of 
Congress’ but I do not chuse to be laid on the gridiron of 
debate in Congress for any such paltry purpose; therefore 
the Introductor need not be told of this qualification of the 
rule. [B]e so good as to explain it in such a manner as to 
avoid offence . . . .38 
 
This effort, however, proved futile. Jefferson found himself somewhat 
engrossed in the gift problem,39 with other diplomats refusing to accept their 
gifts unless he accepted his.40 Eventually he did something extraordinary. 
He asked his secretary to accept the gift, take out the diamonds, sell the 
 
35
  Tillman, supra note 2, at 5. 
36
  MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION: A BIOGRAPHY 401 (1970) 
(link). 
37
  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Apr. 6, 1790), in 12 WILLIAM. & MARY Q. 287, 
294 (1932). 
38
  Id. 
39
  Jefferson’s policy concerning gifts to Foreign Diplomats involved “consult[ing] Adams, Jay, and 
Franklin’s grandson concerning the royal gifts made to American diplomats during the period of 
confederation.” Editorial Note: Jefferson’s Policy Concerning Presents to Foreign Diplomats, in THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON DIGITAL EDITION 356 (Barbara B. Oberg & J. Jefferson Looney eds., 
2008), http://www.rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=TSJN-index-21-8-209-1-2. 
40
  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Jan. 24, 1791), in 13 WILLIAM. & MARY Q. 98, 
98–99 (1933). 
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diamonds, put the money towards Jefferson’s own private account, and not 
report it.41 He insisted that it be kept “absolutely secret so as never to be 
suspected at court.”42 
Jefferson took a gift and then requested that it be physically torn 
apart—as if that rupture could somehow break him from the chain of 
dependencies created by these gifts. Perhaps he hoped that diamonds, split 
up and then reconstituted, might somehow break the link and that the 
mangled snuffbox would be rendered powerless. It is a sad postscript to the 
parade of snuffboxes that Jefferson could not bring himself to act 
consistently with the vision of government above suspicion that he was so 
deeply committed to realizing. 
But Tillman misses what might be the most interesting feature of the 
FEC—that it survived in the Constitution at all. It is one of the few phrases 
to make the jump from the Articles of Confederation to the Federal 
Constitution, and it did so despite being a difficult provision to follow, 
given the commitment of the French government, at least, to keep giving 
gifts regardless of the American prohibition. 
The initial draft of the new Constitution that was circulated did not 
include this provision, but merely prohibited titles of nobility. On August 
23, however, Delegate Charles Pinkney: 
 
urged the necessity of preserving foreign Ministers & other 
officers of the U. S. independent of external influence and 
moved to insert, after Art VII Sect 7. the clause 
following— “No person holding any office of profit or trust 
under the U. S. shall without the consent of the Legislature, 
accept of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind 
whatever, from any King, Prince or foreign State . . . .”43  
 
It passed without discussion. 
The Founders remained committed to radical transformation in the 
dependencies of old world politics, even if it ruffled some feathers. 
III. WHAT IS AN OFFICE UNDER AND OFFICE OF? 
Tillman wants to drag me into a debate about the various uses of the 
word “offices” in the Constitution; I want to drag him into a discussion 
about what makes a legitimate “constitutional principle,” and what courts 
ought to do with the fact that corruption was so central to the Framers. 
Somewhere in the tug-of-war we both, ideally, learn something. I have 
 
41
  Id. at 100; PETERSON, supra note 36, at 401–02. 
42
  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Jan. 24, 1791), supra note 40. 
43
  James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 23, 1787), in 4 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 278, 284 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1903) [hereinafter WRITINGS] (link). 
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already learned something: I have a greater sense of the texture of the 
Incompatibility Clause,44 as Tillman’s critique has forced me to do a close 
reading on the meaning of “offices,” a discussion that at first seemed to me 
trivial. Tillman has different stakes than I, but the reason that it is not trivial 
for me is that (while I still disagree with Tillman about the meaning of 
“offices under”) a close reading has helped me be more precise about what 
the Framers had in mind when they wrote the Foreign Emoluments Clause. 
In particular, it has reinforced my sense that much of what drove concerns 
about corruption at the time were concerns about the abuse of appointment 
powers and abuse by appointees. 
A. Under/Of 
Tillman argues that two clauses in the Constitution—Article I, Section 
6, Clause 2, and Article I, Section 9, Clause 8—do not reach elective 
officers. I am largely persuaded by his arguments here and elsewhere that 
the term “office under” generally referred to appointed officers. However, I 
am not persuaded that it was the technical and precise term that he claims 
for it. Instead, the meaning appears to be more ambiguous. 
To clarify the argument: First, offices can be elected. On this we agree. 
There is no dispute that “office” was used to describe elective and 
appointed positions. It is Tillman’s position that the word “office” itself 
does not signal whether the position is elected or appointed, but that, within 
the Constitution, there are a limited number of explicitly designated elected 
offices.45  
Second, civil offices can be elected. On this we agree. The only work 
the word “civil” does when used as an adjective to describe offices or 
officers is to indicate that the office is non-military. Therefore, civil offices 
or officers can be elected or appointed, just as other offices or officers could 
be. 
Third, the addition of “under/of . . . [a jurisdiction]” may transform 
offices. On this we disagree. According to Tillman, the addition of “under 
the United States” or “of the United States” transforms the word “office” or 
“officer.” When these phrases are used in conjunction with the word 
“office” then the office is appointed only, not elected. Therefore, 
prohibitions that apply to “officers under/of the United States” do not apply 




  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he 
was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have 
been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person 
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance 
in Office.”) (emphasis added) (link). 
45
  See Tillman, supra note 2, at 5–8. 
46
  Id. at 11–13. 
107: 30 (2012)   Gifts, Offices, and Corruption 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/9/ 41 
 
To reiterate: the precise dispute is whether “offices under” or “offices 
of” can ever encompass elected offices, or whether it can only mean 
appointed offices. I do not believe that the words “under” and “of” add 
much precision. Instead, one must understand the ways in which the phrases 
are used in terms of the purpose of individual clauses. Within the context of 
the Constitution, these words, in my view, are not the clarifying words that 
Tillman imagines them to be. While they may have generally accompanied 
descriptions of appointed office, they did not always do so. 
In this Section, I examine the evidence he provides and provide some 
counter-evidence. 
B. The Hamilton List 
Tillman notes that when Alexander Hamilton was asked to produce a 
list of the salaries, fees, and emoluments of “every person holding any civil 
office or employment under the United States, (except the judges),” he did 
not include the President or Vice President in his report.47 He takes this to 
be clear evidence that “office under the United States” meant only 
appointed, not elected, office. That may be correct. It may also be that: (1) 
the salaries of the President and Vice President were widely known and 
therefore not deemed to be necessary in the report; (2) there were other 
prudential or political reasons that Hamilton did not include those salaries; 
(3) the context in which the question was asked led Hamilton to think that it 
was not intended to cover the President or Vice President; (4) Hamilton 
understood “office under the United States” to mean what Tillman says it 
does, but others had a different understanding. In other words, Tillman’s 
careful analysis notwithstanding, it remains ambiguous whether Hamilton’s 
omission of the President and Vice President from his list means that 
neither was an “office under the United States.” 
C. Washington’s Portrait 
Washington, as Tillman notes, accepted a print from the French 
Ambassador without subsequent approval from Congress.48 Tillman takes 
this as evidence that the clause did not apply to the presidency (an elected 
office). I do not see it as so clear-cut. First, it may be that Washington, like 
Jefferson, did not want to be subject to the “gridiron of Congress,” and 
consciously chose to ignore the rule. It could be that Washington 
considered it an important political choice that outweighed the importance 
of following the rule because of the foreign relations at the time. It could be 
that portraits were thought of differently—I have not undertaken a study of 
portraits, but have reason to think that they played a unique role in foreign 
 
47
  Id. at 14–16. 
48
  Id. at 16. 
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relations at the time and may have been understood as outside of the 
archetype of the “present.” It could be that Washington saw the gift as one 
given to him in his personal role, not his official role. It could be that 
Washington occupied such a unique role in American politics that his 
advisors were less likely to press upon him the importance of following the 
letter of the law. And it could be that the value of the print was so small that 
he did not think of it as anything more than an elaborate card. 
I am not willing to take a strong stand on what Washington was 
thinking when he accepted the print, but it strikes me as entirely plausible 
that Washington acted without consideration of whether the clause applied 
to him, not based on a thoughtful reading of the clause. A full exploration 
of this action would require greater examination of the role of portraits in 
foreign affairs. 
D. Van Buren and Tyler 
Washington’s treatment seems exceptional, not normal. Instead, the 
documentation that exists suggests that Presidents felt bound by the 
constitutional provision. If Presidents felt bound, then the provision does 
not apply only to appointed positions. In 1840, President Martin Van Buren 
was offered horses, pearls, a Persian rug, shawls, and a sword by Ahmet 
Ben Haman, the Imam of Muscat.49 The Sultan was told that the President 
was forbidden by the Constitution to accept the presents for his own use; 
Van Buren also wrote to say that it was a “fundamental law of the Republic 
which forbids its servants from accepting presents from foreign States or 
Princes.”50 A joint resolution of Congress authorized him to dispose of the 
presents by giving some to the Department of State and giving the proceeds 
of the rest to the Treasury.51 
A few years later, when President Tyler was given two more Arabian 
horses from the Sultan, he submitted them to Congress, which authorized 
him to auction them off and give the proceeds to the Treasury.52 
E. Contemporaneous Uncertainty Around “Office Under” in Impeachment 
There is some evidence about the uncertainty of the scope of “office 
under” in contemporaneous debate over who can be impeached. The first 
impeachment in the United States was of Senator William Blount in 1797. 
When the House of Representatives impeached him, one of Senator 
Blount’s arguments was that he could not be impeached because he had not 
 
49
  See MOORE, supra note 14, at 582. 
50
  See 14 ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS FROM 1789 TO 1856, at 141 (Thomas Hart 
Benton ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1860) (statement of Martin Van Buren) (link). 
51
  See MOORE, supra note 14, at 582. 
52
  See S. JOURNAL, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 255 (1845) (link). 
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been a “civil officer of the United States.”53 The Senate rejected the House 
impeachment in a private decision. There is ongoing ambiguity about the 
reasons for the Senate’s actions in response to the House. One thing that is 
clear is that there was at least a live legal question about whether Blount 
was an officer: “[M]any debaters assumed that senators themselves were 
civil officers, subject to impeachment.”54 The following quotes come from 
Tillman’s own prior research on the Blount case: 
 
 “The propriety of the House’s action was, arguably, 
rejected by the Senate. However, the Senate materials 
are not absent ambiguity.”55 
 
 “[I]t is not clear whether . . . [the Senate’s] refusal to 
take jurisdiction is to be construed to mean (1) a 
Senator is not an officer within the meaning of Art. 
II, § 4 of the Constitution or (2) that a man who has 
ceased to hold a ‘civil office’ is no longer subject to 
impeachment.”56 
 
 “[Blount’s] lawyers pleaded lack of [Senate] 
jurisdiction on the ground, among others, that a 
senator was not a civil officer and thus not subject to 
impeachment. The Senate dismissed the case, giving 
no reason for its decision. Since Blount had been 
expelled [by the Senate] before the dismissal [of the 
impeachment proceeding], another interpretation is 
that a member of Congress loses his status as a civil 
 
53
  Brian C. Kalt, The Constitutional Case for the Impeachability of Former Federal Officials: An 
Analysis of the Law, History, and Practice of Late Impeachment, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 13, 86–
87 (2001) (“Before arguing anything else, Blount’s representatives, Jared Ingersoll and A.J. Dallas, 
asked the Senate to dismiss the impeachment case: ‘[A]lthough true it is, that he, the said William 
Blount, was a Senator of the United States from the State of Tennessee, at the several periods in the said 
articles of impeachment referred to, yet that he, the said William, is not now a Senator, and is not, nor 
was at the several periods so as aforesaid referred to, a civil officer of the United Sates.’”) (link). 
54
   Id. at 52. 
55
  Seth Barrett Tillman, Interpreting Precise Constitutional Text: The Argument for a “New” 
Interpretation of the Incompatibility Clause, the Removal & Disqualification Clause, and the Religious 
Test Clause—A Response to Professor Josh Chafetz’s Impeachment & Assassination, 60 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 5 n.9), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1622441## (link). 
56
  Id. (quoting RICHARD D. HUPMAN, SENATE ELECTION, EXPULSION AND CENSURE CASES FROM 
1789 TO 1960, S. DOC. NO. 71, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962)). 
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officer, and therefore may not be impeached, after he 
is expelled from Congress.”57 
 
 “Their deliberations, after the argument of counsel, 
being held in private, we can only infer from those 
arguments, that the term officers of the United States, 
as used in the Constitution, was held by a majority of 
the senate, not to include members of the senate, and 
on the same principle, members of the house of 
representatives would also be excluded from this 
jurisdiction.”58 
 
Ten years after the Constitution was written, the House of 
Representatives and the Senate disagreed on the scope of an “officer of the 
United States.” It was not the clear term of art that Tillman suggests, or it 
would have been an open-and-shut case, with no discussion. What I take 
from the story is that the phrase “office of” was not a clear signal of 
“appointed office.” Even if a majority of Senators ultimately agreed with 
Blount’s argument—and it is not certain that they did—they might have 
been persuaded for non-textual reasons, and not simply the use of the word 
“of.” 
F. State Usage of “Under/Of” 
The incompatibility doctrine had a reasonably active life in the state 
courts of the nineteenth century—further illustrating a historically casual 
interchange of “under” and “of.” Under the incompatibility doctrine, the 
general rule was that if someone took an office that was incompatible 
(typically as defined by the state constitution) with another, they were 
deemed to have resigned from the first office. Litigation, then, surrounded 
questions of whether the particular offices fell within incompatibility 
provisions. In this resulting litigation, “office under” and “office of” were 
often used to describe appointed positions, but there was nothing absolute 
or technical about the use of these phrases that suggests, as Tillman would 
have it—that the preposition answers the “elected/appointed” question 
conclusively. 
The difficult debates at the time were about the complex interaction 
between common law incompatibility doctrines, state statutes, state 
constitutions, and imprecise drafting.59 They were not about the “under” or 
“of” as the words were used casually. By way of example (but not 
 
57
  Id. at 6 n.9 (emphasis added) (quoting JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS 
COMPLETE HISTORY AND EARLIEST APPLICATIONS 40 n.§ (1976)). 
58
  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 214 (Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin 2d ed. 1829). 
59
  See, e.g., State v. Buttz, 9 S.C. 156 (S.C. 1877). 
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exhaustive), in a Pennsylvania case, an issue framed by the lawyer in the 
language of “trust or profit,”60 was reframed by the court as “[i]s the place 
of deputy marshal an office under the Constitution and laws of 
the United States?”61 If Tillman is right that “office under. . . [a 
jurisdiction]” is a signal to appointment, the court was very loose about the 
signaling in that case. 
In that Pennsylvania case, the court noted section 13 of the Act of July 
2, 1839, (Pamph. Laws, 521,) which directs the sheriff to: 
 
give notice that every person, excepting justices of the 
peace, who shall hold any office or appointment of profit or 
trust under the government of the United States, or of this 
State, or of any city or incorporated district, whether a 
commissioned officer or otherwise, a subordinate officer or 
agent, who is or shall be employed under the 
legislative, executive, or judiciary department of this State, 
or of the United States, or of any city or incorporated 
district; also, that every member of Congress and of the 
State legislature, and of the select or common council of 
any city, or commissioner of any incorporated district,—is 
by law incapable of holding or exercising at the same time 
the office or appointment of judge, inspector, or clerk of 
any election of this Commonwealth; and that no inspector, 
judge or other officer of any such election, shall be eligible 
to any office to be then voted for.62 
 
Two parts of this passage assume that “office . . . under” can be elected. 
First, Justices of the Peace were frequently elected. Second, the category of 
those holding “office or appointment” under the United States includes 
those who are employed under the “legislative, executive, or judiciary . . . .” 
“Members of Congress” are included in the description. 
In an 1877 case from South Carolina,63 for example, a lawyer described 
the incompatibility clauses this way in passing: 
 
In the earlier times there existed extreme jealousy between 
the States and the general government, which created a 
public sentiment against the officer of the one at the same 
 
60
  The lawyer argued that “[t]his office [of deputy marshal] is not, however, within the letter or the 
spirit of the constitution or statute; it is not one of trust or profit; he is the mere agent of the marshal, 
who is not bound to appoint him, but may perform the duties himself.” Commonwealth ex rel. Owine v. 
Ford, 5 Pa. 67, 68–69 (1846). 
61
  Id. at 69. 
62
  Id. at 70–71 (emphasis omitted). 
63
  Buttz, 9 S.C. at 156. 
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time holding office under the other, and statutes were very 
generally passed to prevent it—it being conceded then that 
there existed no inherent incompatibility, nothing of 
inconsistency in the nature and reason of the thing outside 
of statute.64  
 
The Court uses both “of” and “under” in this passage to encompass 
elected positions. The case itself, however, helps Tillman’s position, 
inasmuch as it describes the core theory of incompatibility as one of 
control—offices are deemed to be incompatible if a person in one office has 
control over the other office. Tillman gets the spirit of the Incompatibility 
Clause right, but might overstate the precision which is used to express it. 
There are dozens of forms of the Incompatibility Clause in state 
constitutions.65 When interpreting these clauses, the courts do not look at 
“under” or “of” as controlling, but rather examine the core principles and 
intentions of the constitutional provisions.66 
Furthermore, the language of the statutes and constitutions suggests no 
such clear line coming from the “under/of” language. 
South Carolina passed its own Incompatibility Act in 1787, stating that 
“no officer heretofore elected, or hereafter to be elected, to any pecuniary 
office in this State, above one hundred and fifty pounds, shall hold any 
other office of emolument under this or the United States.”67 An “officer” is 
“elected” in this vision and is prohibited from holding any “other office 
under this or the United States.” The use of the word “other” here indicates 
that the first instance of election was also an “office under this [State].” 
The Pennsylvania Constitution provided that: 
 
No member of Congress from this state, nor any person 
holding or exercising any office of trust or profit under the 
United States, shall, at the same time, hold or exercise the 
office of Judge, Secretary, Treasurer . . . or any office in 
 
64
  Id. at 166.  
65
  See Dual Office Holding—Restrictions on State Legislators Concurrently Holding a Second 




  See, e.g., Harvey v. Ridgeway, 450 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Ark. 1970) (using secondary source 
opinions to decide whether delegates to a constitutional convention should be considered to hold elected 
office incompatible with a seat in the state legislature) (link); Morris v. Parks, 28 P.2d 215 (1934) 
(distinguishing between “officer” and “employee”); Hollinger v. Kumalae, 25 Haw. 669 (1920) 
(deciding whether a municipal officer should be considered an officer of the Territory of Hawaii). The 
difficult question is more often whether municipal office holders count as holding an incompatible 
office, and not whether the alternative office is elected or appointed. 
67
  Act No. 1368 of 1787, reprinted in 5 Stat. at Large of South Carolina 21 (T. Cooper ed. 1839) 
(link). 
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this state, to which a salary is by law annexed, or any other 
office, which future legislatures shall declare incompatible 
with offices or appointments under the United States.68 
 
The use of “offices or appointments” seems to suggest that offices and 
appointments are not the same thing for Pennsylvanians. 
In short, the use of “under” in the Incompatibility Clause does not 
clarify the meaning of “office” within the clause. An 1867 case illustrates 
the distinction between the spirit and the language. In this case, one 
particularly ambitious individual was “elected” twice: once by the public (to 
a position on the city council), and once by the city council (to the position 
of city marshall).69 The term “election” was used to describe each selection 
process.70 The Court concluded that these were two “incompatible” 
positions because the individual used his position as city councilman to get 
his position as marshall.71 The technical terms “under the state” or “of” 
were not used; the core issue was that the positions were in conflict 
regarding the proper separation of powers, and were therefore incompatible. 
It is my guess that it is this kind of relationship that the Incompatibility 
Clause was meant to avoid, and that the use of the terms “under” and “of” 
are not, and should not be, the center of the inquiries around the 
Incompatibility Clause. 
My own view is not that “under the United States” always referred to 
elected and appointed officials; rather it is that the meaning was not precise 
or clear, and might have encompassed elected officials. I see no indication 
in the texts that “under” was a critical, signaling preposition; instead, other 
words and frameworks were important for the cases. 
G. Does the Foreign Emoluments Clause Apply to Elected Officials? 
What does this do to the Foreign Emoluments Clause? Because I am 
not persuaded that the “under/of” language does what Tillman says it does, 
it is unclear whether it was intended to apply to elected officials as well as 
appointed officials. I suspect that the prospect was not squarely 
contemplated. We agree that the clause was designed for diplomats; 
however, this does not mean that it was intentionally designed to exclude 
elected officials. What a Senator ought to do when offered a gift by the 
King of France or a post of employment by Britain was not a subject of 
debate. When something is outside the precise contemplation of a clause, 
 
68
  PA. CONST. OF 1790, art II, § 8 (link). 
69
  State ex rel. Rosenheim v. Hoyt, 2 Or. 246, 246–47 (1867). 
70
  There is a more general point hidden here; the word “election” is a mode of choice, not always 
associated with popular election, and so the “election/appointment” divide itself is not as clear-cut as 
Tillman assumes. 
71
  Hoyt, 2 Or. at 249. 
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therefore, I suggest that the correct way to think about it is to examine the 
core principles behind the clause. 
What, for instance, do we imagine would have happened if an 1805 
Senator had been given a post and a salary by Britain? What if the Vice 
President had been granted a title of nobility by France and did not ask 
permission to accept it? My stories have focused on the “gifts” part of the 
clause, but the other features of it—those that ban emoluments, offices, and 
titles—help lead the intuition in response to these hypotheticals. 
Given the time, context, and concern about foreign powers and the 
dependencies they create, I would guess that if the Representative from 
Vermont was given a paid position in the French diplomatic corps, for 
instance, everyone at the time would have understood it to violate the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause. If a Senator from Virginia was given the title 
of Duke from Great Britain, it would be attended by constitutional outrage, 
not just popular outrage. Joseph Story, in his commentaries on the 
Constitution, makes a similar argument. The proposed Thirteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution would have extended the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause to all American citizens. In 1851 Story argued that the 
reason this Amendment was not passed was likely because it was seen as 
unnecessary.72 
To my understanding of the time, the hypothetical Senator’s efforts in 
1805 to raise “under” or “of” as defenses to his actions would be of no 
avail. In other words, while I am persuaded that “offices under” generally 
meant what Tillman thinks it meant, each clause is different, and these 
prepositions lacked the transformative and definitional power he ascribes to 
them. 
IV. HOW MUCH DOES IT MATTER? 
Let us assume, however, that Tillman is right in all these critiques: (1) 
that there was a deliberate effort to allow state officers to accept foreign 
gifts (which I think highly implausible); (2) that the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause applies only to appointed, not elected officials (which I think 
unlikely); and (3) that the Framers deliberately ignored threats to corruption 
that they did not embed in the Constitution (which I also think unlikely). I 
still believe these critiques matter less than Tillman makes them seem in 
determining the scope of the anti-corruption principle. 
 
72
  See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1346, at 
216 (1833) (“It is singular, that there should not have been, for the same object, a general prohibition 
against any citizen whatever, whether in public or private life, accepting any foreign title of nobility. An 
amendment for this purpose has been recommended by congress; but, as yet, it has not received the 
ratification of the constitutional number of states to make it obligatory, probably from a growing sense, 
that it is wholly unnecessary.”) (link). 
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A. Application to State Office Holders 
It is my position that there is an anti-corruption principle that applies, 
either as a freestanding principle or as a canon of construction, to all 
constitutional matters, be they state or federal. Tillman argues that if the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause was only intended to apply to the federal 
government, it could not now apply to the states. At the same time, he 
accepts that there is a federal ACP. While he does not lay it out as clearly as 
this, the implication of his argument is either that: (1) there is a federal ACP 
and no state ACP, or (2) the state ACP is weaker than the federal ACP. 
He appears to adopt (2) in this passage: 
 
[I]f her historical claim is incorrect . . . [and] the scope of 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause is limited to 
Offices . . . under [the United States], and excludes offices 
under any State, it would seem to follow that if there is a 
structural anti-corruption principle of constitutional 
dimension, the scope of that principle—even if “translated” 
into modern circumstances—cannot reach state election 
processes.73 
 
To paraphrase: under Tillman’s analysis, the ACP has power to shape 
constitutional interpretation of federal election laws, but not state election 
laws. To understand the implication of this position, consider the recent 
decision in Citizens United.74 In Citizens United, the Supreme Court struck 
down federal legislation designed to prevent political corruption and reduce 
the corrupting tendencies of money in politics. This statute was limited to 
federal offices. If the majority of the Supreme Court had adopted the anti-
corruption principle as a freestanding constitutional principle that ought be 
weighed against the First Amendment concerns, instead of as a non-
constitutional state justification for the laws, I believe (with some evidence 
from the dissent75) the Court might have upheld the congressional ban on 
corporate independent expenditures. However, at a minimum the Court 
would have structured the argument and decisions differently, giving far 
more weight to anti-corruption concerns, broadly understood. 
By separating state government from the federal government, Tillman 
argues that a state-based ban on corporate independent expenditures would 
be far less likely to be upheld because the anti-corruption principle does not 
reach state legislatures within the FEC. He does not directly address 
whether states have authority to regulate their own offices or elections; 
 
73
  Tillman, supra note 2, at 6. 
74
  Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (link). 
75
  See id. at  961–70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (devoting a separate section to the importance of the 
anticorruption interest, grounding it in founders’ history). 
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however, if all else remained equal, the implications of his acceptance of a 
weaker state ACP suggests that a different analysis would apply. 
Therefore, he could argue that Citizens United might have been 
approached with the wrong methodology because it did not recognize the 
federal anti-corruption principle,76 but that the recent Montana Supreme 
Court case which upheld state laws banning independent expenditures was 
also wrongly decided, because states cannot invoke the federal anti-
corruption principle as justification for their laws.77 
If Tillman has a strong view of non-textual principles, or a strong view 
of Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, he might argue that taking both 
the ACP and federalism seriously would result in a wash—state restrictions 
would be granted more deference because they come from the state, and 
federal regulations would be granted more deference because they are 
buoyed by the ACP. I am interested to hear his views. 
Tillman’s argument relies on the FEC being the heart of the ACP. I do 
not believe it is. It is a useful symbolic example, but unlike other clauses—
like those governing elections, civil office-holding, and the veto—it is not 
at the heart of the constitutional principle. It is an example and a support for 
the principle, not the driver of it. 
However, what I had not considered prior to his reading is the 
challenge posed by the incorporation principle. The incorporation principle 
typically applies to rights, not principles like the separation of powers. 
Therefore, even if he is wrong about the FEC, he might be right that the 
ACP does not apply to state laws because there is no way it can be 
incorporated directly against the states. 
This challenge requires us to return to principles about principles. 
There are three ways to understand the anti-corruption principle. First, the 
ACP can be a rule of construction that helps make sense of other provisions 
in the Constitution, including the First Amendment. Second, it can be a 
freestanding principle that can be weighed against other constitutional 
provisions (in which case it would also be substantially incorporated into 
state law by the Due Process Clause.) Third, it can be understood as the 
“true” separation of powers principle. 
While incorporation and application to the states is more analytically 
tricky, if the First Amendment cannot be understood without understanding 
the anti-corruption principle (and I would argue that it cannot), then at least 
(a) as a canon of construction, the anti-corruption principle is applied to the 




  Id. passim. 
77
  W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of State, 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011) (link). 
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B. Application to Elected Officials 
Tillman argues that because the word “offices of trust or profit” does 
not mean elected officials, the ACP does not apply to election law 
regimes.78 For now, suffice it to say that I think he gets this wrong for two 
reasons: (1) the ACP qua principle is part of the structure of the entire 
Constitution, so the fact that a few of the many anti-corruption provisions 
might not apply to elected officials does not mean that it does not apply to 
election laws; and (2) the term office of profit or trust is by no means 
clearly preclusive of elected officers, as I have argued above.79 Moreover, 
even if the references to officers and offices of profit or trust do not apply 
directly to elected officials, one core purpose of the clause is to keep people 
from achieving elected office in order to secure appointed office for 
themselves and their friends. Therefore, it applies directly and explicitly to 
the problems of temptations that attend elected office and is an attempt to 
structure the perks of election in such a way as to encourage those to stand 
for election for reasons of the public, instead of private, good. 
C. That the Framers Could Have Done More Does Not Disprove the Point 
Tillman next argues that the Framers were not obsessed with 
corruption. The thrust of his argument that one cannot believe that the 
Framers were intensely focused on corruption (obsessed, as it were), 
basically boils down to this: Why didn’t they do more? Why didn’t they 
make sure that the foreign gifts provision didn’t apply to every conceivable 
office? Why didn’t they ensure that impeached officers could not serve 
again? Why didn’t they underline (if that was in fact the intent) that no state 
official could receive snuffboxes from the King of France? 
Perhaps we have different definitions of obsession. My point is that in 
the context of the writing of the Constitution, corruption was the touchstone 
by which clauses were examined and the theme with which the basic 
structural elements of the Constitution were assembled. I do not mean that 
every possible “corrupt” scenario was imagined and protected against, 
which would of course be a different kind of obsession. But I do mean 
obsession in the sense that corruption was the orientation of the minds of 
the men who wrote the Constitution. The evidence that is needed, then, to 
support this claim is found in the way they spoke about the provisions, and 
not so much (as Tillman seems to suggest) in the exhaustiveness with which 
they imagined every single corrupting instance imaginable. 
He writes: 
 
[I]f the Framers had been “obsessed” with corruption, it is 
difficult to understand why state offices (and thereby state 
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election processes) and all these federal positions and 
possibilities (e.g., continued government service after 
disqualification for corruption and inheritance under 
foreign law) were left beyond the scope of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause. Was not inheritance the dominant way 
foreign titles were transmitted in the eighteenth century? 
Would inheritance of titles have been beyond the 
imagination of the Framers in a corruption-obsessed 
world?80 
 
The simple answer is that the test is not whether something is “beyond 
imagination” or not. But again, perhaps the disagreement is simply with the 
word “obsession,” which I have no attachment to, and agree with Professor 
Tillman that I might have overused. 
What I mean by “obsession” is that there was a fundamental anxiety 
that most of the men who were involved in the drafting of the Constitution 
shared. That anxiety was concern that structures could be set up that would 
enable those with access to money to “buy” the loyalties of those with less 
access to money and that this relationship would lead to long-term 
dependency. This is not the format for an exhaustive display of the 
perpetual fear of corruption. But, for examples, Madison and Morris both 
explored the threat of representatives and monarchs being bribed by 
interests to betray the public trust in their July 20
 
discussion in the 
convention;81 Benjamin Franklin expressed concern about how the veto 
could lead to “bribes and emoluments” and the threat that “more power and 
money would be demanded, till at last eno’ would be gotten to influence & 
bribe the Legislature into a compleat subjection to the will of the 
Executive”;82 Madison feared that “foreign powers would make use of 
strangers as instruments for their purposes. Their bribes would be expended 
on men whose circumstances would rather stifle than excite jealousy & 
watchfulness in the public”;83 and Williamson feared that “[b]ribery & cabal 
can be more easily practised in the choice of the Senate which is to be made 
by the Legislatures composed of a few men, than of the House of 
Represents. who will be chosen by the people.”84 
Not all of the men at the convention brought this same anxiety, and 
they did not all share the same depth of concern about it. I am not claiming 
an absolute or uniform purpose, but a generally shared one. 
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I use the word “obsession” advisedly—my own reading of the notes 
from the convention suggest that regardless of the topic, the issues of 
influence, dependence, and corruption were at the front of mind for many of 
the speakers there. It occupied their intelligences and challenged their 
thinking. The question of money and influence was as dominant a question 
as any other in the writing of the Constitution. If one reads the notes from 
the convention as trace evidence of a play, I think it is a fair reading of 
motive and purpose. 
The task of determining purpose is necessarily more of a literary task 
than a mechanical one—people leave trace evidence that can be interpreted 
in many ways, and the task of figuring out meaning requires guessing about 
human nature and the relationship between thought and expression as it 
applies to each individual. The anti-corruption principle is not an original 
idea; instead, I think it is a basic way of thinking about the Constitution that 
was lost in the mid-nineteenth century. The writings of Gordon Wood,85 
Bernard Bailyn,86 and others tell the story of the founding era’s focus on 
corruption, but the core of my argument is that there has been a mismatch 
between our historical understandings (which accept corruption as the 
grammar of the time) and our legal understandings. 
CONCLUSION 
It may be useful to explain how I reconstruct the anxiety that drove the 
obsessive (if I may) focus on corruption during the framing of the 
Constitution. As I imagine it, the primary world view involved a set of 
beliefs about human motivation that assumed that the same person could be 
virtuous or corrupt, depending on a combination of circumstance, 
temptation, and temperament. This world view saw the relationship of the 
public servant to the public as one might imagine the relationship of a 
mother to her children. Just as it was psychologically plausible to imagine a 
mother having a healthy self-regard while still putting the interests of her 
child first, it was psychologically plausible to imagine a political office-
holder, either elected or appointed, holding himself in healthy self-regard 
while putting the interests of the public first. 
A mother might pursue other interests than that of her children out of 
self-interest, or out of an inappropriate dependency upon another, usually 
because that other was paying her. Similarly, a public official might fail in 
his obligation to be a public-regarding, public-oriented public official, 
either out of self-interest, or because of an inappropriate dependency upon 
another. The citizens of the founding era had seen in recent British history 
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both kinds of this behavior, which they called “corruption.”87 The great 
heart of the fear was the relationship between the crown and appointed 
offices, because that was what they had experienced. They were very 
anxious about the fact that there was no way to have appointed offices 
without someone doing the appointments. Given the experience in England, 
they were worried that the appointees’ reliance on the appointing power’s 
initial and future goodwill might lead the appointees to be oriented towards 
the appointer instead of the public and thus fail to serve the public interest. 
With the prize of appointments (at the time), the great fear was that the 
appointers would use the power of appointment to wrest great control from 
the people. 
As Tillman points out, this is deeply aligned with contemporary 
scholarship around the idea that public servants are fiduciaries.88 In the 
contemporary vein, this is thought of in terms of “fiduciary law.” He writes 
that the principle “puts federal statutory officers in a fiduciary relationship 
under the government, in respect to the officers’ elected masters and all of 
the nation’s citizens.”89 At the time of the framing, however, the language 
focused less on fiduciaries and more on the spectre of corruption, where 
self-interest, pressure, and power might lead elected and appointed officials 
to stray from the public’s interest. 
I argue that this was not merely a background world view at the time 
but was in fact at the center of the Constitutional Convention, and was one 
of the core purposes behind the structure of Constitution itself. Therefore, I 
argue, we should give the principle and purpose of the Constitution’s anti-
corruption principle real weight in deciding close cases. However, one of 
the things Tillman’s critique points to is the question of this principle’s 
scope—a very important conversation to have, and one which (as I argue 
above) goes not merely to this principle, but to constitutional principles in 
general, and their appropriate role in constitutional decision and thought. 
Tillman and I bring to this exchange two different sets of concerns, and 
while they overlap (which makes this fruitful), our fundamental orientation 
is different. He would pull the discussion more towards a debate on offices 
and the meanings of the particular terms, and I would pull it more towards a 
debate on constitutional principles and how to relate purpose, text, and 
structure. Our surface disagreements mask a generally shared understanding 
of history, but that agreement then masks a disagreement about what is 
most worth fighting over. In the next round, I will be interested to see if we 
come any closer. 
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